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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") § 78-2-2(3)0). By order dated July 18, 2005, the Utah 
Supreme Court, pursuant to its authority found in UCA § 78-2-2(4), transferred this case 
to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
pursuant to the provisions of UCA § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE NUMBER 1 
Was the district court correct when it refused to vacate the default judgment, 
finding that alternative service of process by certified mail on Defendants complied with 
the requirements of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4(d)(4)? (Issue preserved: R. 124-130.) 
Standard of Review 
"A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed 
only for an abuse of discretion. However, when a motion to vacate a judgment is based 
on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is 
lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom 
it runs. Therefore, the propriety of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the 
decision not to vacate, becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the 
district court." Jackson Constr, Co. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, 100 P.3d 121, f 3. 
"Although jurisdictional questions present issues of law, the burden of 
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demonstrating a lack of jurisdiction lies on the party challenging jurisdiction. When a 
judgment, including a default judgment, has been entered by a court of general 
jurisdiction, the law presumes that jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on the party 
attacking jurisdiction to prove its absence." Id. at «[j 4. 
ISSUE NUMBER 2 
Assuming the court had jurisdiction to enter the default judgment against the 
Defendants, was the district court correct in denying the Fuilingims' Motion for Relief 
from Judgment based on its conclusion that the Fuilingims had not proffered a timely 
request or meritorious defense? (Issue preserved: R. 130-131.) 
Standard of Review 
"A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed 
only for an abuse of discretion. Jackson Constr. Co. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, 100 P.3d 
121,13. 
ISSUE NUMBER 3 
Assuming the court had jurisdiction to enter the default judgment against the 
Defendants, and the court properly acted to deny Defendant motion to vacate the default 
judgment, was the signature of the clerk on the damages portion of the Default Judgment, 
harmless error, given the fact that the final Order portion of the default judgment was 
signed by the Judge. (Issue preserved: R. 131-132.) 
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Standard of Review 
The appellant courts "will generally reverse a trial court's denial of a rule 60(b) 
motion only where the court has exceeded its discretion." Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, |^ 
7, 104 P.3d 1198. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
URCP, Rules 4(d), 5(b), 54(a), 55(b)(1), and 60(b)(1) 
The full text of each of these Rules is appended to this brief at Tab A, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
THE NA TURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order entered in this case on June 2, 2005, denying 
the Defendants' Motion for Relief from Judgment under Rule 60(b). 
THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On September 13, 2002, Plaintiff/Appellee, Smith Springs, LLC ("Smith 
Springs"), filed a complaint against the Defendant/Appellant, Fullingims in the Second 
Judicial District Court. (R. 1-8.) On February 12, 2003, the district court ordered this 
case to be dismissed pursuant to rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
("URCP.") (R. 9.) On March 10, 2003, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (R. 
11-18.) At the same time Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Service by Publication and/or 
Mail (R. 19-20), and an Affidavit of Andrea Dover. (R. 21-26.) On March 18, 2003, the 
district court notified Plaintiffs counsel to submit a motion to set aside the dismissal 
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entered on February 12, 2003. (Docket entry from March 18, 2003. The docket is 
appended hereto at Tab B.) On March 21, 2003, an ex-parte Motion to reinstate 
Plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 44-45), with a memorandum in support (R. 31-43) (the 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reinstate Plaintiffs Complaint is appended hereto 
at Tab C) , attaching the Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail and the 
Affidavit of Andrea Dover. (R. 35-42.) 
On April 14, 2003, the district court issued a memorandum decision granting the 
Motion to Reinstate Plaintiffs' Complaint and the Motion for service by Publication 
and/or Mail. (R. 48-49.) On May 12, 2003, the district court entered an Order Granting 
Motion to Reinstate Plaintiffs' Complaint. (R. 52.) On June 10, 2003, the court entered 
an Order Granting Service by Publication and/or Mail. (R. 54-55.) On June 23, 2003 
Smith Springs submitted proof of service in compliance with this Order. (R. 56-58.) On 
August 20, 2003, based on this certification and the failure of the Defendants to appear, a 
deputy court clerk signed a Default Certificate. (R. 68.) On October 3, 2003, a deputy 
court clerk signed a Default Judgment, which was filed on October 14, 2003. (R. 77-78.) 
On November 20, 2003, Judge Baldwin signed an Order permitting Plaintiff to "turn off 
the water to the Fullingim's property," to "require a reconnection fee, if and when the 
Defendants bring their delinquency current," and to "further increase the fees charged for 
water service. (R. 91-92.) On January 10, 2005, the Defendants filed a Motion for Relief 
from Judgment, requesting that the district court set aside the October 14, 2003, Default 
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Judgment and the Order of November 20, 2003. (R. 95-97.) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Upon purchasing their respective properties, both Plaintiff and Defendants were 
bound by a Water Use Agreement, which was signed by their respective successors in 
interest. (R. 2.) Since April 1997, Defendants have been domestic water-users of a well 
owned by Plaintiff. (Affidavit of Keith Smith ("Smith Aff.") f 6. (R. 136.)) The 
Fillingims monthly fee for water provided by the Plaintiff well, has been $15.00 per 
month. (Id. at j^ 7.) To date the Fillingims have made only one payment of $120.00, and 
that was submitted through counsel in May 1999. (Id. at | 8.) At the time of entry of the 
Default Judgment, Defendants owed Plaintiff, $1,587.84. (R. 77-78.) 
David L. Knowles, was Plaintiffs' attorney from the early 1990fs thru December 
2004. (Affidavit of David L. Knowles. ("Knowles Aff") ] 2. (R. 138.)) David L. 
Knowles was retained by Plaintiff to make a demand of the Defendants for back water 
fees and to help address related issues. (Id. at f 3.) During the time David L. Knowles 
represented Plaintiff he dealt with three different law firms claiming to represent the 
Defendants. (Id. at f^ 4. (R. 138-139.)) He states "that the attorneys seemed to constantly 
have problems with the Fullingims being non-responsive to them, and as a result those 
attorneys were often non-responsive to our effort to communicate and resolve issues." 
(id.) 
In early 2002, Plaintiffs attorney, David L. Knowles, sent the Defendants a letter 
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stating that their then-former attorney claimed to no longer represent them and he asked 
them to respond to Plaintiffs' demand for fee payment for water received from the 
Plaintiffs well. (Id. at Tf 5.(R. 139.)) On March 18, 2002, Plaintiffs attorney, David L. 
Knowles, received a letter from Steven E. Clyde stating "that he had been retained by the 
Defendants to represent them on Smith Springs issues." (Id. at ^ 6.) On April 3, 2002, 
Plaintiffs attorney, called Steven E. Clyde and left a message on voice mail, requesting 
that Mr. Clyde return the call and inform him of the Fullingims' position on Smith 
Springs demand for fee payment. (Id. at \ 7.) 
On April 4, 2002, Plaintiffs attorney received a message on voice mail from 
Steven E. Clyde, which said "he was sorry for the delay in getting back to him." (Id. at f 
8.) "He further stated that he really did not know where things were with the Fullingims, 
that he had provided written advice to them, and was waiting for a response back, and that 
he was just then sending them another letter 'asking them what the hell is going on?' ... he 
concluded by promising that he would get back with me if and when he might hear from 
the Fullingims." (Id.) Mr. Clyde sounded frustrated at not having heard from the 
Fullingims. (Id. ) Plaintiffs attorney neither heard again from Steven E. Clyde after that 
voice mail message of April 4, 2002, (Id. at f 9) nor did he hear from the Defendants after 
April, 2002. (Id. at \ 10.) 
On September 13, 2002, Plaintiff, filed a Complaint in the Second Judicial District 
Court, for nonpayment of fees due. (R. 1.) In September and on October 17, 2002, the 
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Summons and Complaint were sent to Defendants by Certified Mail - Restricted Delivery, 
but returned unclaimed. (R. 32.) 
Between December 9, 2002, and February 14, 2003, the Dallas County Sheriff 
Department made eight attempts to deliver the Summons and Complaint to Defendants. 
(R. 39.) On all eight attempts the Sheriff left a card requesting Defendants contact the 
Sheriffs office, and on one attempt the Sheriff actually left the card with a lady at the 
house, who informed the Sheriff that the "Fullingims were in Utah and not back until 
middle of January." (R. 39.) The Sheriffs office never heard from Defendants and the 
Sheriff who attempted to deliver the Summons and Complaint states "I believe they are 
avoiding papers." (R. 39.) 
Sometime mid-March 2003, Keith Smith, a member of Smith Springs, LLC, 
noticed Defendants' car in the driveway of their Hunstville, Utah home. (Smith Aff, ^ 12 
(R. 136.)). He immediately obtained the documents that needed to be served on the 
Defendants and took them to the Weber County Sheriffs office. (Smith Aff, f^ 13 (R. 
136.)). 
On March 14, 2003, the Weber County Sheriffs office attempted service on 
Defendants, however, the papers were returned on March 18, 2003, for the following 
reason: "address is a rental, owners live in Dallas, Texas." (R. 43.) 
On March 21, 2003, through another lawyer at the same firm, Dana T. Farmer, 
Plaintiff filed Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail, along with supporting 
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affidavit, which spelled out the two efforts made to serve Defendants by Mail and 
authenticated and attached the Writ Enforcement Return submitted by Deputy Sheriff 
Robert Tucker from the Dallas County Sheriff Department who noted on his return of 
service as follows: 
8 different attempts were made at house to serve papers. On 12-26-02 talked to a 
lady who said Fullingims were in Utah & not back until middle of January. I left a 
business card with her for Fullingims to call me. Several cards were left on the 
door to call. Have not heard from anyone. I believe they are avoiding papers. (R. 
23) 
The Dallas County Sheriffs Office Return show the attempts were made between the date 
the papers were received, 12-9-02 and the date returned 2-14-03. (R. 23) 
On June 10, 2003, the Court entered an Order Granting Service by Publication 
and/or by Mail. (R. 54-55.) On June 23, 2003, Plaintiff submitted to the Court proof of 
service in compliance with its Order. (R. 56-57.) The certified envelope, containing the 
Summons, Complaint, Ex Parte Motion of Service by Publication and Order Granting 
Service by Publication and/or Mail was "refused"and returned. (R. 58.) The Defendants 
admit that "shortly" after the Default Judgment was entered and the Order signed on 
November 20, 2003, the Defendants learned of these actions. (R. 99.) In December 2003, 
the Defendants contacted the office of Steven E. Clyde of Clyde, Snow, Sessions & 
Swenson, to discover if he had been informed of the complaint. (R. 99.) Steven E. Clyde 
terminated his relationship with Defendants "shortly" after April 3, 2002. (Clyde Aff. ffl[ 
8-9 (R. 113.)) Therefore, during the six months that service was attempted on Defendants 
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(September, 2002 to March, 2003), Mr. Clyde was not Defendants' attorney. 
Just over one year later, on January 11, 2005, Defendants filed a Motion for Relief 
From Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Motion. (R. 95-109.) On June 2, 2005, 
the district court entered an order denying Defendants' motion for relief from judgment. 
(R. 191.) On July 5, 2005, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 194.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court was correct in denying the Defendants' Motion for Relief from 
Judgment. Plaintiff fully complied with requirements of Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure to obtain an order of the court to serve Defendants by alternative means, 
Plaintiff having first exercised reasonable diligence and good faith in locating the address 
of Defendants in Dallas Texas; by further making 10 attempts to personally serve 
Defendants at their home in Texas; and by making one attempt to serve Defendants in 
Utah. When extensive efforts at personal service failed, Plaintiff had good cause to 
believe Defendants were avoiding service. Plaintiff utilized the process for alternative 
service by submitting a Motion for Service by Publication and/or Mail supported by an 
affidavit, which set forth facts pertaining to the efforts to serve Defendants at their 
residence. The court recognized that Plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence necessary to 
locate and serve Defendants and that good cause appeared to believe that Defendants 
were attempting to avoid service, thus the court granted Plaintiffs Motion for Service by 
Publication and/or Mail. The Court granted two options for alternative service by 
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Plaintiff. The first was notice by publication and the second was notice by certified mail. 
The Plaintiff chose certified mail, clearly selecting the option that was specifically 
calculated and designed to provide Defendants notice of the proceedings against them. 
As a presumed direct or indirect result of these efforts, the Defendants had actual notice 
of the proceedings and even spoke with their attorney about 60 days prior to the 
expiration of the time provided in Rule 60(b) for setting aside a default judgment. 
However, they failed to file a Motion for Relief from Judgment within the allotted three 
(3) month period, in fact, Defendants waited more than a year to file their Motion for 
Relief from Judgment. When Defendants filed their motion they failed to state as part of 
their motion a meritorious defense hence their motion was untimely and uncompliant with 
Rule 60(b). 
Though the clerk of the court signed the damages part of the default judgment, the 
court later entered the order granting the additional relief requested of the court. Since 
the court obviously reviewed the file at the time of entry of the final order and reviewed 
the whole file at the time the 60(b) motion was filed by Defendants, the error made by the 
clerk would not have changed the final outcome of the judgment and the error is therefor 
harmless error. 
ARGUMENT 
For Defendants to be relieved of the default judgment, they must show: 1) that the 
judgment was entered against them pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 2) that the 
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motion to set aside the judgment was timely; and 3) that there was a meritorious defense 
to the action. Erickson v. Schenkers InVl Forwarders, Inc. 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 
1994). Defendants did not meet this standard. 
I. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS NOT VOID BECAUSE PLAINTIFF 
AND THE LOWER COURT FOLLOWED THE STANDARDS SET IN 
URCP RULE 4(d) COVERING ALTERNATIVE SERVICE 
The Defendants assert that Plaintiffs Default Judgment is void under URCP 60(b) 
because Defendants were not properly served with summons thus raising a jurisdictional 
challenge to the default judgment. The burden is on Defendants to show lack of 
jurisdiction. 
Although jurisdictional questions present issues of law, the burden of 
demonstrating a lack of jurisdiction lies on the party challenging jurisdiction. 
When a judgment, including a default judgment, has been entered by a court of 
general jurisdiction, the law presumes that jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on 
the party attacking jurisdiction to prove its absence. Jackson Constr. Co. v. Marrs, 
2004 UT 89, 100 P.3d 121 Id at % 4. 
The Utah Court of Appeals specifically outlines what is required to find a judgment void 
under URCP 60(b): 
A judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous or because some irregularity 
inhered in its rendition. It is void only if the court that rendered it lacked 
jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties or if the court acted in a manner 
inconsistent with due process. Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 
382, 385 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting, Automatic Feeder Co. v. Tobey, 558 P.2d 
101, 104 (Kan. 1976)). Id 
For a court to acquire jurisdiction, there must be a proper issuance and service of 
summons. Murdock v. Blake, 848 P.2d 164,167 (Utah 1971). In Utah, Rule 4 of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP) governs service of process. A plaintiff may serve a 
defendant personally or by certified mail pursuant to URCP 4(d)(1)(A) and URCP 
4(d)(2)(A). Alternative service is governed by URCP 4(d)(4), which identifies three 
specific instances where the court may grant alternative service: 1) "where the identity or 
whereabouts is unknown or cannot be ascertained by reasonable diligence," 2) where 
service on all parties is impracticable under the circumstance; 3) "where there exists good 
cause to believe that the person to be served is avoiding service of process." Id. 
Defendants contend that the court did not have jurisdiction of this matter because 
Plaintiff failed to satisfy the reasonable diligence requirement upon which leave for 
alternative service is based, that Defendants were not avoiding service, and that the 
affidavit submitted with the Motion for Service by Publication and/or Mail was 
misleading. 
A, Plaintiff Used Reasonable Diligence to Locate the Defendants Before 
Utilizing Alternative Service* 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4(d)(4), spells out exactly what is required by the 
court before a motion for alternative service will be considered: 
Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown and 
cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, where service upon all of the 
individual parties is impractical under the circumstances, or where there exists 
good cause to believe that the person to be served is avoiding service of process, 
the party seeking service of process may file a motion supported by affidavit 
requesting an order allowing service by publication or by some other means. The 
supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the 
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party to be served, or the circumstance which make it impracticable to serve all of 
the individual parties. Id, 
Plaintiffs, though diligent efforts found the address of the residence of the 
Defendants in Dallas Texas but finding Defendants at home to make personal service 
became the challenge. The efforts made to serve the Defendants after discovering their 
address were as follows: 
1. Attempts to Serve Defendants by Mail or Commercial Courier 
The Plaintiff initially attempted to serve Defendants with the summons and 
complaint by mail pursuant to URCP 4(d)(2)(A), which provides in part: 
The summons and complaint may be served upon an individual ... by mail or 
commercial courier service in any state or judicial district of the United States 
provided the defendant signs a document indicting receipt. 
The complaint was sent certified mail, restricted delivery to Mr. and Mrs. 
Fullingim at their Texas address. (R. 32.) When a piece of mail is marked "certified 
receipt restricted delivery" it is supposed to be given only to the person whose name 
appears on the certified receipt and must be signed for. In this case, the certified receipt 
was returned unsigned on October 15, 2002. (R. 32.) 
Since service by mail requires a signature to be valid personal service, it was sent 
certified mail, restricted delivery to Mr. and Mrs. Fullingim on October 17, 2002 with 
'Restricted Delivery' very clearly marked twice on the envelope and on the certified 
receipt. The envelope was returned on November 27, 2002, unclaimed. (R. 32.) 
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2. Attempts to Personally Serve Defendants in Texas 
Since service by mail was not effective, Plaintiff attempted to obtain personal 
service on Defendants pursuant to URCP 4(d)(1), which provides in part: 
The Summons and Complaint may be served in any state or judicial district of the 
United States by the sheriff... If the person to be served refuses to accept a copy 
of the process, service shall be sufficient if the person serving the same shall state 
the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy thereof Personal service shall 
be made as follows: Upon any individual ... by delivering a copy of the summons 
and/or the complaint to the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode 
with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing. ...Id. 
Plaintiff contacted the Dallas County Sheriffs Office, which is the Sheriffs office 
in the county where Defendants reside. (R. 32.) Between December 9, 2002 and February 
14, 2003, the Dallas County Sheriffs Office attempted to serve the Summons and 
Complaint to Defendants eight times. (R. 39.) On December 26, 2002 the Sheriff was 
able to leave a card, requesting the Fullingims to call the Sheriff, with a woman in the 
home, the woman informed the Sheriff that the "Fullingims were in Utah and not back 
until middle of January." (R. 39.) The Sheriff also left several cards on the door, 
however, at no time did Defendants contact the Sheriffs office, in fact the Sheriff who 
attempted to serve the Summons and Complaint stated, "I believe they are avoiding 
papers/' (R. 39.) 
3. Attempt to Personally Serve Defendants in Utah 
Sometime mid-March, one of the members of Smith Springs, LLC, who lives 
across from Defendants home in Hunstville, Utah, noticed that Defendants' car was in the 
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driveway of their Huntsville home. (Smith Aff |^ 12. (R. 136.)) Aware that Defendants 
had not been served in Texas, he contacted the Plaintiffs attorney, obtained a copy of the 
documents that needed to be served on Defendants and took the documents to the Weber 
County Sheriff (/J. at ffif 13-14.) On March 14, 2003, the Weber County Sheriff 
attempted to serve Defendants at their home in Hunstville, Utah. (R. 43.) However, he 
too was unsuccessful. The Sheriff was informed by the person who answered the door 
that "this is a rental, the owners live in Dallas, Texas." (R. 43.) 
Defendants claim that Plaintiff did not attempt to serve Defendants while they 
were in Utah (Appellants' Brief, page 20) is clearly not supported by the facts. Plaintiffs 
attempt to serve Defendants in Utah was done prior to Plaintiffs' Motion for Service by 
Publication and/or Mail, which was filed on March 21, 2003. (R. 33.) Plaintiff was 
making every effort to find a way to let Defendants know that there was an action 
pending against them. 
Defendants, in their Appellants' Brief, made the following statement about 
Plaintiffs efforts to notify Defendants: "Smith Springs admittedly made some efforts to 
serve the summons on the Fullingims in Texas" (Appellants' Brief, page 18.) However, 
the Defendants claim Plaintiffs efforts were not "reasonably diligent" and that they 
should have used other "readily available sources of relevant information" to locate and 
serve Defendants. 
However, the cases do no support that position. In Jackson Constr. Co. v. Mans, 
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2004 UT 89, 100 P.3d 1211, the court identified the type of efforts that are necessary to 
support a parties request for alternative service. The court slate that "[t]he diligence to be 
pursued and shown by the affidavit is that which is reasonable under the circumstances 
and not all possible diligence which may be conceived." Id. at 1217. 
In Jackson, the court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it made 
reasonably diligent attempts to locate and notify the two non-related, out-of-state 
defendants. Id. The court found that plaintiff made only two attempts to locate the 
defendants, plaintiff "first obtained from the Washington County recorder a single 
California address for both [defendants], [plaintiff] then mailed to the California address 
a letter that was returned marked 'undeliverableV Id. Regarding plaintiffs efforts to 
provide notice the court said "such minimal efforts do not constitute reasonable 
diligence/' Id. The courts reference to turning "a blind eye" to the existence of other 
available sources went directly to the fact that there were many ways of locating a 
defendant, and the court went on to list a variety of ways that the address of the individual 
defendants might be obtained. Id. The court said: 
The diligence to be pursued and shown by the affidavit is that which is reasonable 
under the circumstances and not all possible diligence which may be conceived. 
Nor it is that diligence which stops just short of the place where if it were 
continued might reasonably be expected to uncover an address or the fact of death 
of the person on whom service is sought....[Reasonable diligence] is that diligence 
which is appropriate to accomplish the end sought and which is reasonably 
calculated to do so. If the end sought is the address of an out-of-state defendant it 
encompasses those steps most likely, under the circumstances, to accomplish that 
result. Id. 
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The court went on to clarify that the "reasonable diligence standard does not 
require plaintiff to exhaust all possibilities to locate and serve a defendant." Id. (quoting 
Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah 1976)). The 
means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might 
reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Id. (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950)). 
The Supreme Court of Utah dealt with a similar issue in Parker v. Ross, 117 Utah 
417, 217 P.2d 373 (Utah 1950). The appellant claimed that the affidavit supporting 
alternative service, in that case publication, was deficient by reason of failure of Plaintiff 
to show due diligence to locate the defendant, who was dead. Id. at 374. The affidavit for 
alternative service recited that plaintiff had issued a summons which the Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County had been unable to serve because defendant could not be found in the state 
of Utah; that after searching county records, no information on her could be found except 
two addresses in Butte Montana. Id. at 376. The affiant, sent letters to both those 
addresses and to defendant in care of General Delivery, Butte, Montana. Id. at There was 
no response. Id. The court held that plaintiff did all that was necessary to try and notify 
defendant of the action pending against her. Id. The court went on to say, "our statutes do 
not require either in spirit or intent that more be done than respondent did in the present 
case to try to give actual notice to the record owner of the pending suit." Id. at 377. 
Justice Wolfe in a concurring opinion made the following statement, which would be 
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used at a later time by this court in Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949, P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997): 
The diligence to be pursued and shown by the affidavit is that which is reasonable 
under the circumstances and not all possible diligence which may be conceived. 
Nor is it that diligence which stops just short of the place where if it were 
continued might reasonably be expected to uncover an address;....There have been 
cases where the plaintiff in an action... is untruthful in setting down details in the 
affidavit to show diligence; yet like a person who bustles with activity but 
accomplishes little, makes an imposing recital of nonproductive diligence. Such 
type of "diligence" when probed may reveal a design to draw attention away from 
the fact that a further pursuit might result in an unwelcome disclosure of the actual 
address of the defendant. Due diligence must be tailored to fit the circumstances 
of each case. It is the diligence which is appropriate to accomplish the end sought 
and which is reasonably calculated to do so. Id. at 379. 
Plaintiff was not required to exhaust all possible means of locating or serving 
Defendant, Plaintiff was required to use that "diligence which is appropriate to 
accomplish the end sought and which is reasonably calculated to do so." Id. In the 
present case, Plaintiff used all effort necessary to locate Defendant's address in Dallas 
Texas since Plaintiff actually did locate the plaintiffs Texas address, then focused 
substantial efforts to notify Defendants at their residence in Texas and their known 
second home address in Utah. Plaintiff twice sent notice through the mail, which was 
returned unclaimed. (R. 32.) Plaintiff attempted to serve Defendants at their home in 
Texas eight times over a two month period, when according to someone working at the 
home they should have been at their home in Texas. The Sheriff noted that he believed 
the Defendants were avoiding service. (R. 39.) When all these efforts were not 
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successful, attempts where made to serve Defendants when they were in Utah. (R. 33.) 
The recital made in the motion and affidavit represented to the court Plaintiffs substantial 
efforts (10 attempts) to serve Defendants at their home. (R. 32-33.) Only after all these 
efforts to serve Defendants over a four month period were unsuccessful, did Plaintiff 
resort to alternative service. 
B. Plaintiff Had Good Cause to Believe Defendants Were Avoiding 
Service of Process-
As stated above Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4(d)(4) provides a third instance 
where the court may grant alternative service "where there exists good cause to believe 
that the person to be served is avoiding service of process." Id. 
This test must be viewed from the vantage point of the Plaintiff and the court 
below. Did the Plaintiff and the court below have "good cause" to believe Defendants 
were trying to avoid service? The facts in this case are classic. A total of 10 attempts 
were made to serve Defendants at their Texas residence. At no time in these proceedings 
have Defendants contended that Plaintiff was attempting service at the wrong address. 
The evidence supports the fact that the service address was, in fact, Defendants' 
residence. During one attempt at service someone answered the door at that Texas 
address in December 2002, and informed the Sheriff that the Defendants "were in Utah 
and not back until middle of January." (R. 39.) 
Between December 9, 2002 and February 14, 2003, the Dallas Sheriffs Office 
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attempted service a total of eight times, each time leaving a card, requesting the 
Defendants to contact the Dallas Sheriffs Office. (R. 39.) After the eighth attempt, the 
Sheriff trying to serve Defendants made the following statement, "I believe they are 
avoiding papers."(R. 39.) 
Additionally, one of the members of Smith Springs, who has lived across the street 
from Defendants home in Utah since at least 1997, identified Defendants car in the 
driveway of Defendants' Huntsville home. (Smith Aff ffif 6 & 13. (R. 136.)) Plaintiff took 
the documents to be served on Defendants to the Weber County Sheriff. {Id, at 1J14.) On 
March 14, 2003, the Weber County Sheriff attempted to serve Defendants at their home 
in Hunstville, Utah. (R. 43.) However, he too was unsuccessful. The Sheriff was 
informed by the person who answered the door that "this is a rental, the owners live in 
Dallas, Texas." (R. 43.) The Sheriff did not identify the speaker and the statement given 
by that person was not false, but given the fact that a member of Plaintiff identified what 
he believed to be Defendants' car in the driveway, when the Sheriff attempted service on 
March 14, 2003, certainly gave Plaintiff additional good cause to believe Defendants 
were avoiding process. 
C Plaintiffs Motion for Service by Publication and/or Mail and 
Supporting Affidavit Contained True and Correct Facts, Sufficient to 
Justify Alternative Service 
The party seeking service of process may request alternative service, pursuant to 
URCP 4(d)(4), which states: 
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... the party seeking service of process may file a motion supported by affidavit 
requesting an order allowing service by publication or by some other means. The 
supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the 
party to be served.... Id. 
The Defendants contend that the district court permitted alternative service 
improperly, because the affidavit submitted supporting the Motion for Service by 
Publication and/or Mail was misleading. They claim that the affidavit was misleading 
because it should of informed the court that Defendants had retained counsel, that counsel 
had not been sent a notice and that Plaintiff had not attempted to serve Defendants in 
Utah. 
The court in Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 
1976) stated very clearly that the affidavit supporting a motion for alternative service 
must set forth the facts pertaining to the reasonably diligent efforts (not exhaustive 
efforts) that have been used to notify the party of the action pending against them. Id. at 
509. 
The facts in Downey are very analogous to this case. A California resident 
appealed "the trial court's refusal to grant his motion to set aside a default foreclosure on 
two mortgages covering lands in Summit County." Id. at 508. Defendant contended, 
among other things, that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because: 1) no diligent 
search and inquiry was in fact made; and 2) plaintiffs affidavit was insufficient to justify 
an order to publish a summons. Id. at 508. Regarding the issue of a diligent search for 
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defendant, the court states: 
It is true that the plaintiff did not exhaust all possibilities pointed out by the 
defendant that it appears by hindsight might have been used as a means of finding 
and serving him. But that is not what is required. The requirement is that there be 
exercised reasonable diligence in good faith. On the basis of what has been said 
above and the further facts shown to the trial court... there had been a bona fide 
attempt to serve [defendant] at the only address known to or reasonably obtained 
by the plaintiff, the court was convinced that the requirement for publication of 
summons has been met. We are not persuaded to disagree with that ruling. Id. at 
509. 
Regarding the sufficiency of the plaintiffs affidavit of effort to serve, the court states: 
We recognize that such an affidavit is not sufficienl if it states mere conclusions as 
to diligent search and inquiry. It must set forth facts upon which the court can 
base a judgment as to whether such diligence has been exercised to meet that 
requirement. But when he has done so, his judgment thereon is entitled to the 
same presumptions of verity as other judicial determinations. Id. at 509. 
Plaintiff in this case set forth the efforts that had been made to notify Defendants 
in Plaintiffs Motion for Service by Publication and/or Mail and Supporting 
Memorandum. (R. 19-43) On March 21, 2003, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Service by 
Publication and/or by Mail, (R. 19-30) which spelled out the two efforts made to serve 
Defendants by Mail and authenticated and attached the Writ Enforcement Return 
submitted by Deputy Sheriff Robert Tucker from the Dallas County Sheriffs Department 
who noted on his return of service as follows: 
8 different attempts were made at house to serve papers. On 12-26-02 talked to a 
lady who said Fullingims were in Utah & not back until middle of January. I left a 
business card with her for Fullingims to call me. Several cards were left on the 
door to call. Have not heard from anyone. I believe they are avoiding papers. (R. 
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23.) 
The Dallas County Sheriffs Office Return show the attempts were made between 
the date the papers were received, 12-9-02 and the date returned 2-14-03. (R. 23.) The 
statements are not conclusions but are listed efforts to serve as required by the Rules. 
Defendants assert that failure to notify the court that the Defendant's were 
represented by Mr. Clyde made Plaintiffs affidavit false and misleading. The rule 
requires that the affidavit "set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party 
to be served,. . ." URCP 4(d)(4)(A). Plaintiff made no effort to contact Mr. Clyde and 
therefor that information is not required to be in the affidavit. Further, had Plaintiff 
represented to the court that Defendants were represented by Mr Clyde, that 
representation would have been false since Mr. Clyde had terminated his relationship with 
the Defendants almost a year earlier. (Clyde Aff. fflf 8-9 (R. 113.)) Plaintiffs attorney 
had good reason to believe the Defendants were not communicating with their counsel. 
Plaintiff had initially tried to resolve the issue through three previous counsel without 
receiving a response. (Knowles Aff.^f 5-7. (R. 139.)) Plaintiffs counsel had received a 
telling voice mail from Mr. Clyde stating, "he really did not know where things were with 
the Defendants, that he had provided written advice to them, and was waiting for a 
response back, and that he was just then sending them another letter 'asking them what 
the hell is going on?' (Knowles Aff.. ^ 8. (R, 139.)) Mr. Clyde went on to say in the 
voice mail that he would get back with Mr. Knowles "if and when he might hear back 
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from the Fullingims" (Id.) Plaintiffs attorney did not hear again from Steven E. Clyde 
after the voice mail message of April 4, 2002, (Id. ^  9. (R. 139.) 
Mr Clyde states he would not have accepted service, rather he "would have sought 
the Fullingims permission to accept service of process on their behalf (Clyde Aff. ^ 7, 
(R. 113.)) Given Mr. Clyde's difficulty in communicating with his client, Plaintiffs past 
history with other counsel for Defendants, and Defendants' apparent attempts to avoid 
service of process, Plaintiffs counsel was reasonable in his view that additional efforts 
through Mr. Clyde would be fruitless. Not disclosing that Defendants had once been 
represented by Mr. Clyde does not rise to the level of misrepresentation or make the 
affidavit false or misleading. 
D. Alternative Service Was Reasonably Calculated to Apprise 
Defendants of the Pendency of the Action, 
The court below found cause for alternative service and ordered two alternatives. 
Plaintiff could either use publication or certified mail. Plaintiff chose to use certified 
mail. If this Court agrees with the lower court that Plaintiff used 'reasonable diligence' 
to locate the Defendants or had "good cause to believe" the Defendants were engaged in 
"avoidance of service of process," URCP Rule 4(d)(4)(A), Ihe Court will then look to see 
if the alternative service ordered by the court below was "reasonably calculated under the 
circumstances to appraise the" Defendants "of the pendency of the action." URCP Rule 
4(d)(4)(B). This language of URCP Rule 4(d)(4)(B) is the language of the much quoted 
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U. S. Supreme Court case Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 
(1950). 
In Mullane, the appellee bank and trust company established a common trust fund 
that complied with state law. Id. at 309. Mullane, the special guardian, petitioned for a 
settlement of accounts which if granted would have cut off certain rights of action of the 
beneficiaries of the trust. The only notice given to the beneficiaries was by publication, 
once a week for four weeks in a local newspaper in strict compliance with state law. Id. 
at 309. Appellant objected, contending that the notice to beneficiaries was inadequate to 
afford due process. The record did not show the number or residence of the beneficiaries, 
but they were many and it was clear that some of them were not residents of the State of 
New York. The New York Court of Appeals overruled the objection. The U. S. Supreme 
Court reversed as to beneficiaries of known place of residence, holding that the notice 
statute, requiring only notice by publication, provided inadequate due process for those 
residents whose addresses were known and who therefore could be easily and effectively 
served by mail. Id. at 318. The court stated: 
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding 
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections. Id. at 314. 
Applying this test, the court found as follows: 
Accordingly we overrule appellant's constitutional objections to published notice 
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insofar as they are urged on behalf of any beneficiaries whose interests or 
addresses are unknown to the trustee. As to known present beneficiaries of known 
place of residence, however, notice by publication stands on a different footing. 
Exceptions in the name of necessity do not sweep away the rule that within the 
limits of practicability notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach 
interested parties. Where the names and post-office addresses of those affected 
by a proceeding are at hand the reasons disappear for resort to means less 
likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency. Id. at 318. (Emphasis 
Added) 
The Mullane case does not rule out the constitutionality of service by publication 
but establishes service by mail as the due process gold standard for alternative service. 
The state legislature has required or allowed service by certified mail as the 
primary, or the only notice in a myriad of state and private actions that can effect the 
substantive rights of persons. A Lexis search of Utah statutes shows over 130 statutes 
that provide for notice by certified mail. These include in very small part: requested 
notice in the case of default or foreclosure of a deed of trust (in addition to filing in the 
county recorder's office), UCA § 57-1-26; notice of seizure and sale of a mobile or 
manufactured home for failure to pay taxes (other personal property only requires notice 
by publication), UCA § 59-2-1303; service of process on an entity whose registered agent 
has resigned without a replacement or an entity which has been dissolved, UCA §§ 
16-10a-504, 1409; notice to property owners of the institution of a civil forfeiture 
proceeding against their property by a prosecutor, UCA § 59-2-1351; notice to a property 
owner in the case of filing of a mechanics lien, UCA § 38-1-7; and notice to property 
owner to remove "weeds, garbage, refuse, objects, or structures" for which a municipality 
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may do the clean up and charge the property owner for expenses incurred, UCA § 10-11-
3. Neither the foregoing nor the vast majority of other notice statutes require that the 
certified letter be received or accepted by the addressee. 
The Defendants argue and provide an affidavit to the effect that they did not 
actually receive the papers mailed by certified mail. The return receipt was marked 
"REFUSED 9-19-05." (R. 59.) Someone at the Defendants' residence was presented 
with the appropriate papers but rejected them. This is consistent with Mr. Fullingim's 
Affidavit which reads; 
The housekeeper and employees have been informed that they are not to accept 
certified mail or other documents that are directed to me or my wife while we are 
out of town. (Fullingim Aff. K 4 (R. 117.)) 
Defendants have made the choice to accept the risk that they may not receive: notice of 
default of a loan on their Utah property; notice of seizer, sale, or civil forfeiture of certain 
property located in Utah; notice of a mechanics lien on their Utah property; and many 
other actions by private and public entities that effect their rights and their property in 
Utah. Given the common use of certified mail as a notice vehicle by government and 
private institutions, Defendants' decision to have their agents reject certified mail in their 
absence exposes them to unknowing loss of rights from other state and institutional 
actions as well. Their decision to risk non-receipt of notice of such actions does not 
invalidate the efficacy of those actions nor should it invalidate the efficacy of the ordered 
alternative service in this case. Had the return receipt been signed by one of them, the 
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alternative service would have constituted personal service and not alternative service. 
In this case the parties were properly identified and their address known. 
Considering the confidence expressed by the U. S. Supreme Court in the mails generally 
and confidence demonstrated by the Utah State Legislature in certified mail specifically, 
the lower court's selection of certified mail as an alternative method of service should be 
sustained as "reasonably calculated under the circumstances to apprise the Defendants of 
the pendency of the action." Defendants have not met their burden to show otherwise. 
E. Conclusion to Part I. 
In the end, the adequacy of the alternative service or the original attempts of 
service can also be judged by their success. The Defendants actually received notice of 
the pendency of the action as a result of the efforts made by Plaintiff. "Shortly" after 
default judgment was entered Defendants were in contact with competent counsel in 
discussions about notice of the filing of the complaint with 60 days to go to set the default 
judgment aside pursuant to Rule 60B (R. 99.) Though a default judgment had already 
been entered, had Defendants timely filed a 60(b) motion along with an answer stating a 
meritorious defense, the court below would have been bound to set the judgment aside the 
default judgment given the fact that personal service had not been affected on 
Defendants. Naisbitt v. Herrick, 290 P. 950, 953 (Utah 1930). 
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II. DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT WAS 
NOT TIMELY AND DID NOT STATE A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE. 
For Defendants to be relieved from the default judgment, they must show not only 
that uthe court did not act in a manner inconsistent with due process," Richins, 817 P.2d 
at 385, but that the motion to set aside the judgment was timely; and that there was a 
meritorious defense to the action. Erickson 882 P.2d at 1148. Due process was addressed 
above. Therefore, Defendant can only be relieved from the default judgment if they had 
made a timely motion to set aside and had offered a meritorious defense, they did neither. 
A. Within Thirty Days of the Order Being Signed, Defendants Knew of 
the Proceeding and Judgment Against Them, Yet They Failed to Make 
a Timely Request to Set Aside the Judgment-
There is a discrete three month time period within which a party may submit a 
request to be relieved from a default judgment. URCP 60(b) provides in part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal represenative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding... The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons 
(1) (mistake...); (2) (newly discovered evidence...); and (3) (fraud...), not more than 
3 months after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken... Id. 
Defendants claim that they did not have notice of the proceedings, but "shortly" 
after the Order was signed on November 20, 2003, the Defendants learned of these 
actions. (R. 99.) In December 2003, the Defendants contacted the office of Steven E. 
Clyde. (R. 99.) While the record is vague on this matter, somehow the Defendants 
(maybe by way of all the efforts to serve stated below) received enough "notice" to check 
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and find out the status of the proceeding against them. Therefore, "shortly" after 
November 20, 2003, but sometime before the end of December, 2003, the Defendants 
knew of the proceeding and the judgment against them. Within a month of knowing of 
the judgment against them, the Defendants contacted Mr. Clyde, to specifically ask if he 
had received notice of the proceedings, he informed them that he had not. (R. 99.) By 
December 2003, only one month after the Order was signed by the court, the Fillingims 
had knowledge of the proceeding against them, and had talked to an attorney specifically 
about the fact that they had not received notice of that proceeding. The Defendants, 
believing that a judgment had been entered against them in a proceeding that they had not 
had notice of, waited until January 10, 2005, more than one full year, to file their 60(b) 
Motion for Relief from Judgment. The Defendants had enough notice to file a timely 
60(b) motion, which they failed to do. 
B. Defendants Failed to State a Meritorious Defense, 
For Defendants to be relieved from the default judgment, Defendants answer must 
contain a defense which is entitled to be tried. Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149. The court in 
Downey (supra) further clarified "one who seeks to vacate a judgment must proffer some 
defense of at least sufficient ostensible merit as would justify a trial of the issue thus 
raised/' Downey, 545 P.2d at 510. 
Defendants failed to proffer any defense in their motion, initial memorandum or 
affidavits. Defendants only attempt at a defense was mentioned in their Reply 
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Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief from Judgment, asserting that no 
contractual arrangement existed to obligate them to pay Plaintiff for water services, was 
sufficient to satisfy the meritorious defense burden. (Appellants' Brief, page 27, footnote 
7.) However, if there was no contractual relationship between the parties, why did 
Defendants make at least one payment to Plaintiff for use of water from the well. (R. 3.) 
Defendants failed to offer any other type of defense 
The trial court was not persuaded by the Defendants assertions, and found that the 
Defendants "failed to file a request for relief from judgment within the allotted 3 month 
period" and "failed to proffer a meritorious defense that would justify a trial on the issues 
raised." (R. 191.) 
Plaintiff had proffered under oath, a prima facia case supporting the judgment. 
Defendants have not proffered any meritorious defense on the merits of the original 
complaint. Defendants, having failed to file a timely request to set aside the judgment 
and assert any meritorious defense have failed to meet the requirements for relief from 
judgment, therefore their request to set aside the Default Judgment should be denied. 
III. THE FINAL ORDER WAS SIGNED BY THE JUDGE, THEREFORE 
SIGNATURE OF THE CLERK ON THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
AMOUNTS TO NOTHING MORE THAN HARMLESS ERROR. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(a) provides as follows: 
"Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an 
appeal lies. Id. 
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Defendants claim, because they were not personally served, the Default Judgment 
is void because the clerk, not the judge, signed the default judgment, which was filed on 
October 14, 2003. (R. 77-78.) However, the final judgment (styled "Order") filed on 
November 20, 2003, was executed by Judge Baldwin. (R. 91-92.) That Order permitted 
Plaintiff to "turn off the water to the Fullingim's property," to "require a reconnection 
fee, if and when the Defendants bring their delinquency current," and to "further increase 
the fees charged for water service. (R. 91-92.) The Default Judgment simply dealt with 
Plaintiffs awarded judgment of $1,587.84. (R. 77.) The administrative error on the part of 
the clerk, regarding the initial entry of the Default Judgment was reviewed by a Judge and 
incorporated in a final Order or judgment, when the Judge stated Plaintiff may "require a 
reconnection fee, if and when the Defendants bring their delinquency current." (R. 91.) It 
is the Order, not the Default Judgment, from which an appeal lies, therefore the signature 
of the clerk on the Default Judgment amounts to nothing more than harmless error. 
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure instructs us on harmless error: 
No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the 
court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
"Harmless error1' is defined as an error that is "sufficiently inconsequential that we 
conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
35 
proceedings." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). The clerks signature on the 
Default Judgment was sufficiently inconsequential, the Default judgment dealt only with 
the amount owed. The Order, which dealt with Plaintiffs' request for relief, was signed 
by the Judge and incorporated, by implication, the default judgment. The fact that the 
default judgment was signed by the clerk, before the final order and the fact that they 
were both reviewed as part of Defendants' 60(b) Motion without being disturbed by the 
trial court verifies that the outcome of the proceedings would not be different had the 
clerk presented the default judgment to the court for signature. 
If this Court finds that the Default Judgment was signed in violation of URCP 
55(b)(1), the only thing Defendants would be granted relief from is a judgment in the 
amount of $1,587.84. The Defendants would not be granted relief from the final Order 
which was signed by the Judge, which instructed Plaintiff to, "turn off the water to the 
Fullingim's property," to "require a reconnection fee, if and when the Defendants bring 
their delinquency current," and to "further increase the fees charged for water service. (R. 
91-92.) Should the court not find the clerks error to be a harmless one, the appropriate 
relief in this case would be to remand the contractual damage issue to be tried by the trial 
court. 
The Court should not disturb a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such 
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage 
of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendants have failed to meet their burden to show that Plaintiffs acts in this case 
have been, in any way, unreasonable, not in good faith, or out of the ordinary and 
standard process for initiating alternative service. To hold that the facts in this case fall 
short of the standard expected of attorneys, their clients, and trial courts in alternative 
service cases will open to challenge just about every alternative service case the trial 
courts will ever deal with and no one can ever be comfortable that a judgment will stand 
if service of process has been other than personal. Therefore, the court should uphold the 
trial courts denial of Defendants Motion for Relief from Judgment. 
Dated this 14th day of July, 2006. 
BUSINESS LAW ASSOCIATES, L.C 
J. Steven Newton 
Bilinda K. Townsend 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
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Tab A 
Rule 4. Process. 
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and issued by the plaintiff or the 
plaintiffs attorney. Separate summonses may be signed and served. 
(b)(i) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons together 
with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later than 120 days after the filing of the 
complaint unless the court allows a longer period of time for good cause shown. If the 
summons and complaint are not timely served, the action shall be dismissed, without 
prejudice on application of any party or upon the court's own initiative. 
(b)(ii) In any action brought against two or more defendants on which service has been 
timely obtained upon one of them, 
(b)(ii)(A) the plaintiff may proceed against those served, and 
(b)(ii)(B) the others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial. 
(c) Contents of summons. 
(c)(1) The summons shall contain the name of the court, the address of the court, the 
names of the parties to the action, and the county in which it is brought. It shall be 
directed to the defendant, state the name, address and telephone number of the plaintiffs 
attorney, if any, and otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number. It shall state 
the time within which the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and 
shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by default will be 
rendered against the defendant. It shall state either that the complaint is on file with the 
court or that the complaint will be filed with the court within ten days of service. 
(c)(2) If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the summons shall state that the 
defendant need not answer if the complaint is not filed within 10 days after service and 
shall state the telephone number of the clerk of the court where the defendant may call at 
least 13 days after service to determine if the complaint has been filed. 
(c)(3) If service is made by publication, the summons shall briefly state the subject matter 
and the sum of money or other relief demanded, and that the complaint is on file with the 
court. 
(d) Method of Service. Unless waived in writing, service of the summons and complaint 
shall be by one of the following methods: 
(d)(1) Personal service. The summons and complaint may be served in any state or 
judicial district of the United States by the sheriff or constable or by the deputy of either, 
by a United States Marshal or by the marshal's deputy, or by any other person 18 years of 
age or older at the time of service and not a party to the action or a party's attorney. If the 
person to be served refuses to accept a copy of the process, service shall be sufficient if 
the person serving the same shall state the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy 
thereof. Personal service shall be made as follows: 
(d)(1)(A) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (B), (C) or (D) 
below, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the individual 
personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode 
with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of 
the summons and the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process; 
(d)(1)(B) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 years) by delivering a copy of the 
summons and the complaint to the infant and also to the infant's father, mother or 
guardian or, if none can be found within the state, then to any person having the care and 
control of the infant, or with whom the infant resides, or in whose service the infant is 
employed; 
(d)(1)(C) Upon an individual judicially declared to be of unsound mind or incapable of 
conducting the person's own affairs, by delivering a copy of the summons and the 
complaint to the person and to the person's legal representative if one has been appointed 
and in the absence of such representative, to the individual, if any, who has care, custody 
or control of the person; 
(d)(1)(D) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated by the state 
or any of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy of the summons and the 
complaint to the person who has the care, custody, or control of the individual to be 
served, or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of the individual to 
be served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any case, promptly deliver the process 
to the individual served; 
(d)(1)(E) Upon any corporation not herein otherwise provided for, upon a partnership or 
upon an unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a common name, by 
delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to an officer, a managing or general 
agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process 
and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, 
by also mailing a copy of the summons and the complaint to the defendant. If no such 
officer or agent can be found within the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or 
holds itself out as having, an office or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or 
does business within this state or elsewhere, then upon the person in charge of such office 
or place of business; 
(d)(1)(F) Upon an incorporated city or town, by delivering a copy of the summons and the 
complaint to the recorder; 
(d)(1)(G) Upon a county, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the 
county clerk of such county; 
(d)(1)(H) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy of the 
summons and the complaint to the superintendent or business administrator of the board; 
(d)(l)(I) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy of the summons and 
the complaint to the president or secretary of its board; 
(d)(l)(J) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be brought 
against the state, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the attorney 
general and any other person or agency required by statute to be served; and 
(d)(l)(K) Upon a department or agency of the state of Utah, or upon any public board, 
commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy of the summons and the 
complaint to any member of its governing board, or to its executive employee or 
secretary. 
(d)(2) Service by mail or commercial courier service. 
(d)(2)(A) The summons and complaint may be served upon an individual other than one 
covered by paragraphs (d)(1)(B) or (d)(1)(C) by mail or commercial courier service in any 
state or judicial district of the United States provided the defendant signs a document 
indicating receipt. 
(d)(2)(B) The summons and complaint may be served upon an entity covered by 
paragraphs (d)(1)(E) through (d)(l)(I) by mail or commercial courier service in any state 
or judicial district of the United States provided defendant's agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process signs a document indicating receipt. 
(d)(2)(C) Service by mail or commercial courier service shall be complete on the date the 
receipt is signed as provided by this rule. 
(d)(3) Service in a foreign country. Service in a foreign country shall be made as follows: 
(d)(3)(A) by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice, such 
as those means authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial 
and Extrajudicial Documents; 
(d)(3)(B) if there is no internationally agreed means of service or the applicable 
international agreement allows other means of service, provided that service is reasonably 
calculated to give notice: 
(d)(3)(B)(i) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that 
country in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; 
(d)(3)(B)(ii) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory or letter of 
request; or 
(d)(3)(B)(iii) unless prohibited by the law of the foreign country, by delivery to the 
individual personally of a copy of the summons and the complaint or by any form of mail 
requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the 
party to be served; or 
(d)(3)(C) by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by 
the court. 
(d)(4) Other service. 
(d)(4)(A) Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown and 
cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, where service upon all of the 
individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or where there exists good 
cause to believe that the person to be served is avoiding service of process, the party 
seeking service of process may file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an order 
allowing service by publication or by some other means. The supporting affidavit shall set 
forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the 
circumstances which make it impracticable to serve all of the individual parties. 
(d)(4)(B) If the motion is granted, the court shall order service of process by publication 
or by other means, provided that the means of notice employed shall be reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency 
of the action to the extent reasonably possible or practicable. The court's order shall also 
specify the content of the process to be served and the event or events as of which service 
shall be deemed complete. Unless service is by publication, a copy of the court's order 
shall be served upon the defendant with the process specified by the court. 
(d)(4)(C) In any proceeding where summons is required to be published, the court shall, 
upon the request of the party applying for publication, designate the newspaper in which 
publication shall be made. The newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of general 
circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and shall be 
published in the English language. 
(e) Proof of Service. 
(e)(1) If service is not waived, the person effecting service shall file proof with the court. 
The proof of service must state the date, place, and manner of service. Proof of service 
made pursuant to paragraph (d)(2) shall include a receipt signed by the defendant or 
defendant's agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. If 
service is made by a person other than by an attorney, the sheriff or constable, or by the 
deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the marshal's deputy, the proof of 
service shall be made by affidavit. 
(e)(2) Proof of service in a foreign country shall be made as prescribed in these rules for 
service within this state, or by the law of the foreign country, or by order of the court. 
When service is made pursuant to paragraph (d)(3)(C), proof of service shall include a 
receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee satisfactory 
to the court. 
(e)(3) Failure to make proof of service does not affect the validity of the service. The 
court may allow proof of service to be amended. 
(f) Waiver of Service; Payment of Costs for Refusing to Waive. 
(f)(1) A plaintiff may request a defendant subject to service under paragraph (d) to waive 
service of a summons. The request shall be mailed or delivered to the person upon whom 
service is authorized under paragraph (d). It shall include a copy of the complaint, shall 
allow the defendant at least 20 days from the date on which the request is sent to return 
the waiver, or 30 days if addressed to a defendant outside of the United States, and shall 
be substantially in the form of the Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service 
of Summons set forth in the Appendix of Forms attached to these rules. 
(f)(2) A defendant who timely returns a waiver is not required to respond to the complaint 
until 45 days after the date on which the request for waiver of service was mailed or 
delivered to the defendant, or 60 days after that date if addressed to a defendant outside of 
the United States. 
(f)(3) A defendant who waives service of a summons does not thereby waive any 
objection to venue or to the jurisdiction of the court over the defendant. 
(f)(4) If a defendant refuses a request for waiver of service submitted in accordance with 
this rule, the court shall impose upon the defendant the costs subsequently incurred in 
Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Service: When required. 
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the court, 
every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent 
to the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery, every written motion other 
than one heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, 
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. 
(a)(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that: 
(a)(2)(A) a party in default shall be served as ordered by the court; 
(a)(2)(B) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be served 
with all pleadings and papers; 
(a)(2)(C) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of any hearing 
necessary to determine the amount of damages to be entered against the defaulting party; 
(a)(2)(D) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of judgment 
under Rule 58A(d); and 
(a)(2)(E) pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against a party in default 
for any reason shall be served in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
(a)(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest, attachment, 
garnishment or similar process, in which no person need be or is named as defendant, any 
service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, claim or appearance shall be 
made upon the person having custody or possession of the property at the time of its 
seizure. 
(b) Service: How made and by whom. 
(b)(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a 
party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless 
service upon the party is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party 
shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the last known address or, if 
no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. 
(b)(1)(A) Delivery of a copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to the 
party; or leaving it at the person's office with a clerk or person in charge thereof; or, if 
there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, if the office is 
closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the person's dwelling house 
or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing 
therein; or, if consented to in writing by the person to be served, delivering a copy by 
electronic or other means. 
(b)(1)(B) Service by mail is complete upon mailing. If the paper served is notice of a 
hearing and if the hearing is scheduled 5 days or less from the date of service, service 
shall be by delivery or other method of actual notice. Service by electronic means is 
complete on transmission if transmission is completed during normal business hours at 
the place receiving the service; otherwise, service is complete on the next business day. 
(b)(2) Unless otherwise directed by the court: 
(b)(2)(A) an order signed by the court and required by its terms to be served or a 
judgment signed by the court shall be served by the party preparing it; 
(b)(2)(B) every other pleading or paper required by this rule to be served shall be served 
by the party preparing it; and 
(b)(2)(C) an order or judgment prepared by the court shall be served by the court. 
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there is an unusually large 
number of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own initiative, may order that 
service of the pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto need not be made as 
between the defendants and that any cross-claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an 
avoidance or affirmative defense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or 
avoided by all other parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof 
upon the plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the parties. A copy of every such order 
shall be served upon the parties in such manner and form as the court directs. 
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed 
with the court either before or within a reasonable time after service. The papers shall be 
accompanied by a certificate of service showing the date and manner of service 
completed by the person effecting service. Rule 26(i) governs the filing of papers related 
to discovery. 
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court 
as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court, except 
that the judge may accept the papers, note thereon the filing date and forthwith transmit 
them to the office of the clerk. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order 
from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report 
of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments shall state whether they are 
entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise 
directed by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than 
one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross 
claim, or third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct 
the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and 
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination 
and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates 
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of 
decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the 
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, 
every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered 
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given 
for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among 
themselves. 
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or 
exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a 
statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing 
party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other 
proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with 
such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to 
the extent permitted by law. 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry 
of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a 
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file 
with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge 
the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the 
action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days 
after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by 
the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent 
to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the 
entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the date 
judgment is entered. 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any 
judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was 
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, 
within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not 
included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that 
purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment 
docket. 
Rule 55. Default 
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has 
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to 
appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the 
amount claimed and costs against the defendant if: 
(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear ; 
(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person; 
(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and 
(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be made 
certain by computation. 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply 
to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into 
effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to 
establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other 
matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems 
necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default 
and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance 
with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply 
whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, 
or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment by 
default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall 
be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the 
claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record 
and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any 
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the 
court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before 
the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending . 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On 
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not 
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, 
order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by 
an independent action. 
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REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 0K-2K 
Amount Due: 45.00 
Amount Paid: 45.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 0.50 
Amount Paid: 0,50 
Amount Credit: 0,00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 11.00 



















































5H BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Civil, 








09-13-02 Case filed 
09-13-02 Judge BALDWIN assigned. 
09-13-02 Filed: Complaint 
09-13-02 Fee Account created Total Due: 45.00 
09-13-02 COMPLAINT 0K-2K Payment Received: 45.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 0K-2K 
Q2-12-03 Notice - Order of Dismissal for Case 020906507 
Based on a review of this file and Rule 4(b) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court orders this case be dismissed, without 
CASE NUMBER 020906507 Water Rights 
prejudice, for failure to serve the defendant within 120 days of 
filing the Complaint. 
02-12-03 Case Disposition is Dismissed debbiel 
Disposition Judge is PARLEY R, BALDWIN debbiel 
02-12-03 Filed order: Order of Dismissal 
Judge pbaldwin 
Signed February 12, 2003 
03-10-03 Filed: First amended complaint 
03-10-03 Filed: Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail 
03-10-03 Note: Recfd Order Granting Service by Publication and/or by 
Mail 
03-10-03 Filed: Affidavit of Andrea Dover 
03-17-03 Note: file sent to PRB 
03-18-03 Note: Dana Farmer is notified to submit a motion to set aside 
dismissal. 
03-21-03 Filed: Notice to Submit on Ex-Parte Motion to Reinstate 
Plaintiff*s Complaint and Motion to Serve by Publication and/or 
by Mail 
03-21-03 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reinstate Plaintiff's 
Complaint 
03-21-03 Filed: Ex-Parte Motion to Reinstate Plaintiff's Complaint 
03-21-03 Filed: Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail 
03-21-03 Filed: Affidavit of Andrea Dover 
03-24-03 Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date May 23, 
2003, 
03-28-03 Note: file sent to PRB 
04-15-03 Filed order: Memorandum Decision 
Judge pbaldwin 
Signed April 14, 2003 
04-15-03 Filed order: Memorandum Decision 
Judge pbaldwin 
Signed April 14, 2003 
04-15-03 Tracking ended for Under advisement. 
04-21-03 Note: Rec'd Order Granting Motion to Reinstate Plaintiff's 
Complaint 
05-06-03 Note: file sent to PRB 
35-14-03 Filed order: Order Granting Motion to Reinstate Plaintiff's 
Complaint 
Judge pbaldwin 
Signed May 12, 2003 
06-06-03 Note: Order Granting Service by Publication and/or by mail 
placed in Judge PRB's basket for signature with file. 
06-10-03 Filed order: Order Granting Service by Publication and/or by 
Mail 
Judge pbaldwin 
Signed June 09, 2003 
06-25-03 Filed: Proof of Service 
Q8-20-03 Filed; Cost memo 
38-20-03 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Ex Parte 
CASE NUMBER 020906507 Water Rights 
08-20-03 Issued: Default Certificate 
Clerk harrietb 
08-20-03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020906507 ID 8199012 
We are unable to enter the default judgment/certificate in this 
case for the following reasons: 
Notes: We do not have any service of process in the file. 
Apparently you served by mail. You can not charge the defendant for 
postage, except the certification fee. Amended Complaint states 
principal to be $900, but the Judgment shows $960'. Successor 
Agreem't? 
Dated this day of , 20 
District Court Clerk 
10-03-03 Filed: (Amended) Cost memo 
10-14-03 Judgment #1 Entered 
Creditor: SMITH SPRINGS LLC 
Debtor: JOHN P FULLINGIM 
Debtor: KRISTIN E FULLINGIM 
1,587,84 Total Judgment 
1,587.84 Judgment Grand Total 
10-14-03 Filed judgment: Default Judgment/3,41% Per Annum 
Clerk harrietb 
Signed October 03, 2003 
10-15-03 Case Disposition is Judgment 
Disposition Judge is PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
10-29-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.50 
10-29-03 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.50 
11-04-03 Note: Rec'd Order 
11-04-03 Filed: First Amended Complaint 
11-12-03 Note: file sent to PRB 
11-20-03 Filed order: Order 
Judge pbaldwin 
Signed November 17, 2003 
12-05-03 Filed: Notice of withdrawal , as counsel - Dana T Famer for 
Smith Springs lie 
10-29-04 Fee Account created Total Due: 11.00 
10-29-04 COPY FEE Payment Received: 11.00 
11-01-04 Filed: Notice of Appearance- Atty Hartvigsen- John Fullingim 
11-01-04 Filed: Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel 
01-11-05 Filed: Motion for relief from judgment 
01-11-05 Filed: Memo in support of motion for relief from judgment 
lorenaa 
lorenaa 
1-05 Filed: Affidavit of John P Fullingim 
1-05 Filed: Affidavit of Steven E Clyde 
1-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 2.00 
1-05 COPY FEE Payment Received: 2.00 
0-05 Filed: Memorandum in opposition to defendants motion for relief 
from judgment 
3-05 Filed: Reply memorandum in support of motion for relief from 
judgment 
4-05 Filed: Request to Submit Defendant's "Motion for Relief from 
Judgment" for Decision 
5-05 Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Apr 26, 
2005. 
6-05 Tracking ended for Under advisement. 
6-05 Filed order: Memorandum Decision 
Judge pbaldwin 
Signed April 26, 2005 
9-05 Note: Received Order Denying Defendants Motion for Relief from 
Judgment 
6-05 Note: FILE TO PRB 
4-05 Note: Order held waiting for mailing certificate. 
7-05 Filed: Letter, with attached Certificate of Mailing 
2-05 Filed order: Order Denying Defendants Motion for Relief from 
Judgment 
Judge pbaldwin 
Signed June 01, 2005 
7-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.00 
7-05 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.00 
Note: COPY FEE, Faxed copies (included with another case) 
5-05 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
5-05 Filed: CERTIFICATE THAT TRANSCRIPT IS NOT REQUIRED 
5-05 Filed: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
5-05 Filed: NOTICE OF FILING COST BOND ON APPEAL 
2-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 205.00 
2-05 APPEAL Payment Received: 205.00 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL, Mail Payment/ 
2-05 Bond Account created Total Due: 300.00 
2-05 Note: COST BOND 
2-05 Bond Posted Payment Received: 300.00 
Note: COST BOND, Mail Payment; 
0-05 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court 
1-05 Filed: Letter from the Utah Court of Appeals #20050621 
3-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 5.50 
3-05 COPY FEE Payment Received: 5.50 
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Dana T. Farmer (8371) 
SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON, P.C. 
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Telephone: (801)476-0303 
Facsimile: (801)476-0399 
Attorneys for Smith Springs, LLC 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 




JOHN P. FULLINGIM and KRISTIN E. 
FULLINGIM, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO REINSTATE PLAINTIFFS 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 020906507 
Judge Baldwin 
MAR 2 4 2003 
Plaintiff Smith Springs, LLC ("Smith"), now appearing through its counsel of record, 
Dana T. Farmer of the law firm of Smith, Knowles & Hamilton, P.C, and pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedures 60(b) and Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
hereby propounds the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion 
10 Reinstate Plaintiffs Complaint. This Memorandum is in addition to the Motion to Serve by 
Publication and/or by Mail and Affidavit of Andrea Dover, which have been filed with the Court 
0 ?, 1 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On September 13, 2002, Smith Springs, through counsel of record, Dana T. Farmer 
of the law firm Smith, Knowles & Hamilton, filed a complaint against John P. Fullingim and 
Kristin E. Fullingim ("Mr. and Mrs. Fullingim"). 
2. The Complaint was sent Certified Mail, Restricted Delivery to Mr. and Mrs. 
Fullingim. The U.S. Post Office offers a service called Restricted Delivery for a fee of $3.50 If 
the Certified Receipt is marked Restricted Delivery it is supposed to be given only to the person 
whose name appears on the Certified Receipt and must be signed for. In this case, the Certified 
Receipt was returned unsigned on October 15, 2002, Exhibit "A". 
3. Since service by mail requires a signature to be valid, it was sent again Certified 
Mail, Restricted Delivery to Mr. and Mrs. Fullingim on October 17, 2002 with "Restricted 
Delivery" very clearly marked twice on the envelope and on the Certified Receipt. The envelope 
was returned on November 27, 2002, unclaimed, Exhibit "B". 
4. On December 4, 2002, the Dallas County Sheriffs Office was contacted about 
service for Mr. and Mrs. Fullingim. They informed my office that service might take several 
weeks considering that the holidays were coming up, and to check back at the beginning of 2003. 
5. My office contacted the Dallas County Sheriffs Office twice to check on service. 
Several attempts were made, by the Dallas County Sheriffs Office, to serve Mr. and Mrs. 
Fullingim, but were not successful. 
022 
6. On February 14, 2003 the Dallas County Sheriffs Office returned the service 
packet along with the Writ Enforcement Return, detailing the attempts to serve Mr. and Mrs. 
Fullingim, attached as Exhibit "C". 
7. On March 7, 2003 a Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail, Exhibit 
"D", was prepared and sent to the Court along with an Affidavit of Andrea Dover, Exhibit "E", 
explaining what had been done to serve Mr. and Mrs. FuUingim. 
8. On March 10, 2003 Smith learned that the Fullingim's were in Utah and wanted to 
attempt service while they were here. The Weber County Sheriffs Office was contacted and 
given an address in Huntsville, where Mr, and Mrs. Fullingim were staying. On March 14, 2003 
the Weber County Sheriffs Office returned the service packet and a Return of Service, Exhibit 
"F", showing they were unable to serve Mr. and Mrs. Fullingim. 
9. On February 21st, 2003, the complaint was dismissed for failure to serve within 
120 days as required by Utah of Civil Procedure 4(b). 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to rule 4(b), a party must serve the complaint within 120 days after filing. If the 
complaint is not served timely, the matter may be dismissed. However, where good causes 
shown, the court may grant extension. Presently, it is clear that numerous efforts have been made 
to serve the defendants in this matter. However, due to the fact that they reside out-of-state and 
since it appears they are intentionally avoiding service, Plaintiff has not been able to serve them 
within the 120 day time limit. Yet, diligent efforts have been made during the pendency of this 
action to serve the Defendants. 
033 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff requests that the motion to reinstate the granted. 
DATED this ^ 6 day of March, 2003.
 ( 
SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON, P.C. 
Dana T. Farmer 
Attorney for Smith Springs, LLC 
Dana T. Farmer (8371) 
SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON, P C . 
Attorneys for Smith Springs, LLC 
4723 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 476-0303 
Facsimile: (801) 476-0399 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 




JOHN P. FULLINGIM and KRISTIN E. 
FULLINGIM, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR SERVICE BY 
PUBLICATION AND/OR BY MAIL 
MAR 2 4 2003 
Civil No. 020906507 
Judge Baldwin 
Plaintiff, by and through counsel of record, Dana T. Farmer of SMITH, KNOWLES & 
HAMILTON and pursuant to Rule 4(d)(4)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, move the Court 
for an Order that service of process upon Defendant JOHN P. FULLINGIM AND KRISTIN E. 
FULLINGIM, may be made by publication and/or by mail as follows: 
a. By publication of the Summons in a newspaper of general circulation in Dallas, 
Texas, the county in which Defendant JOHN P. FULLINGIM AND KRISTIN E. FULLINGIM is 
located; and/or 
b. By mailing, postage prepaid, a copy of the Summons, Complaint, Motion to Serve 
by Publication, and Order Granting Service by Publication and/or by Mail to Defendants' last known 
addresses as follows: John P. Fullingim and Kristin E; Fullingim, 5802 Club Oaks Dr., Dallas, Texas 
^YHIRTT « n » 
035 
75248; and/or 
c. By mailing, by certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy of the Summons, 
Complaint, Motion to Serve by Publication, and Order Granting Service by Publication to 
Defendants' last known addresses as follows: John P. Fullingim and Kristin E. Fullingim, 5802 Club 
Oaks Dr., Dallas, Texas 75248. 
Attempts to locate Defendants JOHN P. FULLINGIM AND KRISTIN E. FULLINGIM have 
been unsuccessful in that it is believed Mr. and Mrs. Fullingim are avoiding service as evidenced by 
the attached affidavits. 
The above means of service of process are reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, 
to apprise the Defendants of the pendency of the action, 
DATED this j f 2 l day of March, 2003. 
SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON, P.C 
'[) l-UP / *' 6V v\^ 
Dana T. Farmer 
Attorney for Smith Springs, LLC 
Dana T. Farmer (8371) 
SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON, P.C. 
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Telephone: (801)476-0303 
Facsimile: (801)476-0399 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT STATE OF UTAH 




JOHN P. FULLINGIM and KRISTIN E. 
FULLINGIM, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREA DOVER 
Civil No. 020906507 
Judge Baldwin 
MAR 2 4 2003 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
Andrea Dover, having been first duly sworn, deposes as follows: 
1. Affiant is the employee of Smith, Knowles & Hamilton, counsel of record for 
Smith Springs, LLC, in the above-referenced matter, and the information contained in this 
affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge. 
2. Attached is a true and correct copy of the envelope that the Summons and 
Complaint were sent in and the Certified Mail Restricted Delivery Receipt showing that the 
Summons and Complaint were unclaimed. 
3. Also attached is a true and correct copy of an affidavit of the Sheriff Department 
F Y H T m x m?n 
in Dallas County Texas, hired by Smith, Knowles and Hamilton to serve Mr. and Mrs. Fullingim 
showing that they tried eight different times, but could not serve the Summons and Complaint. 
DATED this 7 day of March, 2003. 
Andrea Dover, Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this - \ ^ day of. 
2003. 
W\CLYCM 
LISA K BURKER 
NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE of UTAH 
4723 HARRISON BLVD. STE 200 
OGOEN UT 84403 
COMM. EXR 06-04-2005 
AiAfb Ic 
Notary Public 
DALLAS COUNTY SHERIFF DEPPRATMENT 
WRIT ENFORCEMENT SECTION 
133 North Industrial Blvd LR-31 
Dallas Texas 75207 
£<?::*v '"**&. 
WRIT ENFORCEMENT RETURN 
DSO# No3 3 QhSSMO2 6?0bSd7 
SUBJECT'S NAME J/) L, f. fafdvU,** 4- fir, 
DATE RECEIVED /9< ~9—&3* DATE RETURNED <P*~ < ¥ ~" C3 
Your civil documents are being returned, unexecuted, for the following reasons: 
The court date on the document has expired 
Subject moved from address provided 
Subject unknown at the address provided r^~~^T^-::'.~::- . { 
Subject evicted from address provided ' V-\ :'* 
No such address in Dallas County 
Fee is insufficient •*• 
v 
Citation is over ninety (90) days old 1— 
y ^ y Three attempts were made at address provided with no results 
Request for substitute service under Texas rule 106 or 536 
Address provided is a P. O. Box. Request that we be provided with a home or work address 
Address for service not in Dallas County 
No Apartment number provided 
Subject no longer employed at address provided 
Other 
/ / ffi^~^U*</^ ~ * Y Z 2 » JIM BOWLES, SHERIFF 
/(V) Robert Tucker # 122 — DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS 
9
 J Deputy Sheriff ( ) - 9 
Writ Enforcement Section 

U.S. Postal Service 
CERTIFIED MAIL RECEIPT 










Return Receipt Fee 
(Endorsement Required) 
Restricted Denver-/ Fee 
(Endorsement Required) 











5/reef. Apt. No.: ^ ^ ., 
*C;ry/sVaVe."Z/P-J*".lll""." , " " "*/Ll 
PS ft>m> 3800, Jamiaty 200J See Beverse for Instructions 
S E N D E R : COMPLETE THIS SECTIQ^ 
a Complete Items 1, 2, and 3. Also complete 
item 4 if Restricted Delivery is d e s i r e 
• Print your name and address on the reverse 
so that we can return the card to yo u . 
• Attach this card to the back of the friailpiece, 
or on the front if space permits. 
1. Article Addressed to: 
Szc^
 CLua> CA^ p^ 
7S*Y& 
2. Article Number 
(Transfer from service label) 
PS Form 3 8 1 1 , August 2001 





8. Received by (Printed Name) C. Date of Delivery 
D. Is delivery address different from item 1? D Yes 
If YES, enter delivery address below: Q No 
3. Servjpe Type 
. j j^Cert i f ied Mail D Express Mail 
O Registered . Q Return Receipt for iVfercnancfee 
D Insured Mail • C.O.D. 
4. Restricted Delivery? (Extra Fee) Yes 
7002 DS10 0000 U f l b b473 
Domestic Return Receipt 102S9S-02-M-1540 
041 
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE First-Class Mail -
Postage & Fees Paid 
USPS 
Permit No. G-10 
• Sender: Please print your name, address, and ZIP+4 in this box 
— ^ 
Dana T. Farmer lg 
Smith, Knowles & Hamilton, P.C, 
4723 Harrison Blvd. Suite 200 
Ogden, UT 84403 





Ogden, UT 84401 
rocess Number: 0302057 Court Number: 020906507 
Brad W Slater, Sheriff of Weber County Sheriff's Office do hereby certify 
hat I received the within and foregoing Summons/Complaint on 10th day of 
arch, 2003, and that I served the same on: 
John FULLINGIM 
5908 East Snow Basin Road 
Huntsville, UT 84317 
defendant 
have made due search and inquiry and exercised due diligence, btit I am 
^turning the Summons/Complaint UNSERVED after making the following service 
"tempts: 
srvice attempted on 14th day of March, 2003 at 14:20:00 
lis is a rental, the owners live in Dallas Texas. 















Brad W Slater, Sheriff 
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